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I. INTRODUCTION
This study focuses on the provisions set forth in section
120(a)(4) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)' waiving federal
sovereign immunity to actions based on state CERCLA-like laws
concerning removal 2 or remedial actions' in response to the release4

I
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar.
3, 1997). This section provides, "State laws concerning removal and remedial
action, including State laws regarding enforcement, shall apply to removal and
remedial action at facilities owned or operated by a department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States or facilities that are the subject of a deferral
under subsection (h)(3)(C) of this section when such facilities are not included on
the National Priorities List. The preceding sentence shall not apply to the extent
a State law would apply any standard or requirement to such facilities which is
more stringent than the standards and requirements applicable to facilities which
are not owned or operated by any such department, agency, or instrumentality."
Citation to the U.S.C.A. is made due to Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2484
(1996), which inserted, "or facilities that are the subject of a deferral under
subsection (h)(3)(C) of this section." This amendment was added after the issuance
of the latest supplement to the U.S.C. (Supp. 11995). The amendment includes
application to federal facilities subject to the deferral provisions section
120(h)(3)(C) of CERCLA which pertain to the deferral of the provision of a
warranty that the United States will undertake any remedial action found necessary
under CERCLA for federal property transfers covered by CERCLA section 120(h).
This amendment has no bearing on the issues discussed in this paper, but reference
heretofore will be made in this paper to 42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) as it contains the
latest version of CERCLA section 120(a)(4).
2
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1994). Remove or removal is defined
as "the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment,
such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of
hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous
substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as
may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or
welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat
of release. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security
fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies,
temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided
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for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this title, and any emergency assistance
which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
[42 U.S.C. s 5121 et seq.]").
3
Id. § 9601(24). Remedy or remedial action is defined by CERCLA as
"those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to
removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or
future public health or welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not
limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement,
perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization,
cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials,
recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging
or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate
and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies,
and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the
public health and welfare and the environment. The term includes the costs of
permanent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities where
the President determines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such
relocation is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the
transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of
hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health
or welfare; the term includes offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment,
destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated
contaminated materials."
4
Id. § 9601(22)(defming "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping,
or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of
barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which results
in exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which
such persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions from
the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline
pumping station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear
material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defmed in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.], if such release is subject to requirements
with respect to financial protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission under section 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. § 2210], or for the purposes
of section 9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of source
byproduct, or special nuclear material from any processing site designated under
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or threatened release5 of a hazardous substance.6 Currently the waiver
only applies in cases of federal facility7 ownership or operation' by

section 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal application of
fertilizer").
5
"Threatened release" is not defined by CERCLA, but has been defined
generally as a condition with the potential to result in release into the environment;
see United States v. Martell, 887 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
6
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (defining "hazardous substance" to mean, "(A) any
substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section
9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified
under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 6921) (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.) has been suspended by Act of Congress),
(D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous
air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7412), and
(F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which
the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term
does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not
otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include
natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for
fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas)).
7
Id. § 9601(9) (broadly defining facility as "any building, structure,
installation..., impoundment..., landfill, storage container," and "any site or area
where a hazardous substance has... come to be located").
8
Id. § 9601(20)(A)(stating that "[t]he term 'owner or operator' means (i)
in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such
vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person
owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control
of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency,
abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person
who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility
immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." Reference is
made to 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20) for the definition in its entirety, including
treatment of issues such as ownership resulting from foreclosure, etc., as provided
by Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2502(b), which added §9620(E)-(G).
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a federal department, agency or instrumentality at the time the state
law action is initiated, or when a facility was transferred by the
federal government subject to the deferral provisions of section
120(h)(3)(C) of CERCLA.9 ,10
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4), (h)(3)(C) (West, WESTLAW
through Mar. 3, 1997); see also Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F.
Supp. 224 (W.D. Mich. 1993); andRedland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of
Army of United States, 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992)(These cases held that
federal ownership or operation must be current at the time the state CERCLA-like
law action is commenced; however, the subsequent revision of section 120(a)(4)
of CERCLA also waives federal sovereign immunity where the federal government
transferred the facility in accord with the deferral provisions of section
120(h)(3)(C) of CERCLA, and the facility is not listed on the National Priorities
List. There have been no reported cases, to date, interpreting this additional
scenario where federal sovereign immunity from state CERCLA-like law has been
waived).
10
See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(h) (West, WESTLAW through Mar.
3, 1997)(this section, as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-210, 110 Stat. 2484 (1996),
governs CERCLA issues connected to the transfer of federal property).
Subparagraph (h)(3)(C) provides in part: "(I) In general, [the] Administrator, with
the concurrence of the Governor of the State in which the facility is located (in the
case of real property at a Federal facility that is listed on the National Priorities
List), or the Governor of the State in which the facility is located (in the case of real
property at a Federal facility not listed on the National Priorities List) may defer the
requirement of subparagraph (A)(ii)(I) with respect to the property if the
Administrator or the Governor, as the case may be, determines that the property is
suitable for transfer," with this suitability decision premised on conditions set forth
by sections 120(h)(3)(C)(I)-(IV). Subparagraph (h)(3)(A)(ii)(I) provides in part:
"After the last day of the 6-month period beginning on the effective date of
regulations under paragraph (2) of this subsection, in the case of any real property
owned by the United States on which any hazardous substance was stored for one
year or more, known to have been released, or disposed of, each deed entered into
for the transfer of such property by the United States to any other person or entity
shall contain"... "a covenant warranting that"... "any additional remedial action
found to be necessary after the date of such transfer shall be conducted by the
United States"; "the last day of the six month period beginning on the effective date
of the regulations under paragraph (2) of this subsection," was October 16, 1990,
see 40 CFR § 373.1 (1996). The waiver of federal government sovereign immunity
is only slightly expanded by the amended provisions of section 120(a)(4) of
CERCLA as the fore-mentioned provisions must have been met prior to the transfer
9
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The issue of the federal government's liability for hazardous
substance releases is arguably more than an issue of consistency with
how the private sector is treated in order to avoid the appearance of
hypocrisy. The federal government owns and operates more land and
buildings in the United States than any private entity, and as such, its
potential liability under any federal or state environmental law
regulating private entities is a high visibility issue.'
The federal government has been recognized as being the
governmental entity most involved in the promulgation of statutes
aimed at environmental protection in the United States. 2 The result
of the efforts of the federal government in the area of environmental
affairs has been the development of a comprehensive federal
framework providing for environmental protection. 3
The focus of federal environmental statutes and regulations has
not only been on regulation of current and future behavior that
threaten the environment, and the ramifications of such behavior, but
also on imposing liability for harm caused by past behavior that has
resulted in pollution - the effects of which pose potential risks to

of the property (i.e., if no deferral was sought, or the site was not on the National
Priorities List, or the transfer took place on or before October 16, 1990, the federal
government's sovereign immunity to state CERCLA-like laws is not waived).
1t
OFFICE OF FED. ACTIVITIES, EPA, FEDERAL FACILITIES COMPLIANCE
STRATEGY, 111-6 (1988) (hereinafter cited as STRATEGY), cited in Stan Millan,
FederalFacilitiesand Environmental Compliance: Toward a Solution, 36 LOY.
L. REV. 319, 321 (1990)(The federal government owns or leases in excess of
700,000,000 acres of land and 380,000 buildings).
12
John E. Davenport, Comment, State Rights: Imposition ofState Sanctions
Against the Federal Government for Environmental Violations, 5 U. BALT. J.
ENvTL. L. 1, 2 (1995).
13
See generallyClean Air Act (hereinafter CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671

(1994 & Supp. 11995); Clean Water Act (hereinafter CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1994 & Supp. I 1995); Resource Recovery and Conservation Act
(hereinafter RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. I 1995)(These
statutes are indicative of those promulgated and codified to protect air, water,
disposal of waste, etc., but do not, by any means, comprise a complete list of
federal environmental law).
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current and future generations. 4 CERCLA is an example of
legislation which focuses on present environmental harms resulting
from past conduct."
This federal framework has prompted, and in some cases
necessitated, states to follow the lead of the federal government by
enacting statutes and regulations implementing federal enforcement
regimens. 16 However, states also have acted on their own initiative
to enact statutes and promulgate regulations that mirror federal
statutes and regulations even when the latter do not include explicit
provisions for state enforcement.' 7 Finally, states have been forced
to alter existing statutes and regulations in order to come into
compliance with provisions of federal law. 8
Attempts to apply state laws with purposes similar to CERCLA
to federal agencies and facilities may be stymied by the federal
government' s use of sovereign immunity as a defense to certain
actions brought against it under these state laws. 9 These clashes lead
to several questions: (1) Are CERCLA's current provisions waiving
the federal government's sovereign immunity from state liability too

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 11995) (indicating that
CERCLA's main focus is on the cleanup of sites previously contaminated by
14

hazardous waste, not the prevention of future pollution).
15
Id.
16
See generallyCAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1994) ( requiring every state to
prepare a state implementation plan for the implementation, maintenance, and
enforcement of National Ambient Air Quality Standards).
17
See generally Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (hereinafter
HSCA), 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6020.101-6020.1305 (1993). HSCA is a state
statute with the same purpose as CERCLA.
18
See generallyRCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1994)( allowing for state to issue
treatment, storage or disposal facility (TSDF) permits if the state has adopted a
permit program equivalent to that of RCRA, thus less stringent state requirements
pertaining to the permitting of TSDFs would have to be altered or else they would
be rendered meaningless by the provisions of RCRA).
19
See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3,
1997)(stating that federal sovereign immunity is waived in certain, but not all,
instances).
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limited, too broad, or are they reasonable?; (2) What, if any,
modifications should be made regarding the federal goverrnent's
sovereign immunity from liability under state CERCLA-like laws?;
(3) How should any changes to the sovereign immunity provisions of
CERCLA be made?; and (4) Will suggested procedural and
substantive revisions result in a more equitable system?
II. COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT (CERCLA)
A. Summary of the History and Purposes of CERCLA
An understanding of the history and purpose of CERCLA is
helpful to properly analyze the current status of sovereign immunity
for the federal government under state laws with a purpose similar to
CERCLA's.
CERCLA was enacted in part because common law was
viewed as inadequate to protect the environment from problems
arising from the handling of hazardous waste."z These perceived
shortcomings of common law include difficulty in proving the
proximate cause of particular harm, a favoring of relief in the form of
compensation rather than injunctions to achieve prevention of harm,
and inherent difficulties in proving present injury for exposure to a
hazardous substance because the harm may not manifest itself until
years after the alleged tortious act.2 ' Promulgation of CERCLA and
similar federal statutes exemplify efforts to alleviate the shortcomings
of common law theories when seeking redress of environmental
damage.22
Since the 1970s, a plethora of federal laws, and amendments to
these laws, have been enacted to provide environmental protection.

20

JEFFREY G. MILLER & CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS

WASTE DISPOSAL AND REMEDIATION
21

Id.

22

Id

39 (1996).
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These include the Clean Air Act (CAA)23 (aimed at protecting the air
from pollution), the Clean Water Act (CWA)24 (aimed at protecting
surface waters from pollution), and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA)25 (aimed at protecting the land and ground
water from solid and hazardous wastes).
The primary emphasis of the preceding federal statutes was,
and remains today, the regulation of future behavior and actions, not
the remediation of damages caused by acts that occurred prior to the
enactment of these laws.26 Events such as those at Love Canal,27
however, demonstrated a need for legislation to provide a framework
for the remediation of harm resulting from past practices - practices
that often were in accordance with the laws and regulations of the
day.28 The 96th Congress, in its waning days passed, and President
Jimmy Carter signed into law, the original version of CERCLA.29
The main goal of CERCLA is the remediation of
environmental damage resulting from past actions, regardless of the
legality of those practices at the time at which they were employed."
23
24
25

CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 11995).

26

RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. 11995).
MILLER & JOHNSTON, supranote 20, at 52.

27

See Marc G. Laverdiere, Natural Resource Damages: Temporary

Sanctuaryfor FederalSovereign Immunity, 13 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 589, 600 (1994).

Love Canal, New York was used by a chemical company for the disposal of
industrial wastes between 1947 and 1952. The site where disposal took place was
sold to the Niagara Falls Board of Education in 1953, which erected an elementary
school on the site. The industrial wastes began to leak (in 1976) onto the
playground at the elementary school, and into basements of homes surrounding the
school. Studies associated the leaking of the wastes to an increased rate of
miscarriages and birth defects.
28
MILLER & JOHNSTON, supranote 20, at 52.
29
CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). See also Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (hereinafter SARA), Pub. L. 99499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986)(CERCLA was amended and reauthorized by the

SARA); and Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388 (1990)(subsequent reauthorization of CERCLA).
30
MILLER & JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 52.
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The prerequisites for the imposition of liability under CERCLA are
set forth in the language of section 107 of CERCLA.3 The legality
of past practices at the time at which they occurred is not a defense to
liability under CERCLA.32 This approach results in the closure of the
statutory environmental protection loop by imposing liability for
present harms which have been caused by actions that occurred prior
to the enactment of statutes (such as RCRA) regulating future
behavior.3
CERCLA provides for the remediation of sites where
hazardous substances have been released, or where there is a
threatened release of hazardous substances.3 Such remediation can
be undertaken by the federal government, state governments, or
potentially responsible parties.35 CERCLA also authorizes persons
who have incurred response costs as a result of such a release or
threatened release to bring an action in federal court, against those
parties potentially responsible for the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances, to recover any and all costs incurred in
remediation actions.36
This section's basic overview of CERCLA's history and
purpose is followed in the next section by an examination of liability
provisions, and of CERCLA's provisions with respect to federal
sovereign immunity from provisions of state laws governing the past
release and threatened release of hazardous substances.
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b), (j) (1994). No provisions are included within those
defenses set out in the statute for a defense based on the acceptability of a practice
31

32

resulting in the release of a hazardous substance, and in fact, such a provision
would be counter to the intent of CERCLA.
33

See ROBERT V. PERCIvAL,

ALAN

S. MILLER,

H.
279-282

CHRISTOPHER

SCHROEDER & JAMES P LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

(1996)(An overview and summary of how events such as Love Canal demonstrated
a need to address releases of pollutants that occurred as a result of conduct prior to
enactment of regulations, such as RCRA, aimed at regulating behavior).
34
42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994).
35
See id.
36
See id. § 9607.
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B. CERCLA Liability and Consequences of Liability
Examination of the liability provisions of CERCLA, and their
applicability to the federal government, is critical in determining
what, if anything, should be done concerning sovereign immunity of
the federal government to claims brought under state laws modeled
after CERCLA.
1. CERCLA Liability and Consequences in General
a. CERCLA Liability as a Potentially Responsible Party
A party who may be liable under the provisions of section 107 of
37
CERCLA is deemed to be a "Potentially Responsible Party" (PRP).
A PRP's liability under CERCLA may be monetary (for damages for
the response costs incurred by others due to actions of the PRP)38 or
the PRP may be subject to an administrative order issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), enforceable by a federal
court, requiring it to undertake all necessary remedial action.39
There are four classes of persons who can be PRPs under
CERCLA.40 The first class of PRPs are owners and operators of a
vessel4 or facility where a release or threatened release of a
1

PRP (Potentially Responsible Party) is a general term and acronym for
those persons subject to CERCLA liability.
38
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
37

39
40

Id. § 9606.
Id § 9607(a); see also MILLER & JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 64 (noting

that the elements to establish a case under an administrative order issued under 42
U.S.C. § 9606 are essentially the same as to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. §
9607, which is helpful as the former does not identify PRPs); United States v.
Outboard Marine Co., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1992)(explaining that a party who
would be liable as a PRP in a cost recovery action can also be issued a cleanup
order).
41
42 U.S.C. § 9601(28) (1994)(defining the term "vessel" as "every
description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being
used, as a means of transportation on water").
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hazardous substance has occurred and response costs are incurred.42
Ownership of the facility alone has been held to trigger liability; there
is no need for the owner to have been involved in the activities
leading to the disposal, release or threatened release of the hazardous
substance.43 Owners who have asserted a lack of control over
disposal activities taking place on their property have been
determined nevertheless to meet the criteria of being a CERCLA
PRP.

44

The second category of PRPs includes any person, who, at the
time of disposal" of any hazardous substance at a facility, owned or
operated the facility where disposal of a hazardous substance took
place, and from which a release of the hazardous substance occurred
causing response costs to be incurred. 46 This category has been
interpreted by some courts to establish PRP status for a past owner or
operator of a facility as a result of "passive disposal" such as the
passive leakage of a hazardous substance from a container and its
subsequent movement through the environment even in the absence

See id. § 9607(a)(1).
See First Capital Life Ins. Co. v. Schneider, Inc., 608 A.2d 1082 (Pa.
Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 614 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1992).
44
See Elf Atochem-North America, Inc. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 707
42

43

(E.D. Pa. 1994); see also United States v. Wedzeb Enterprises, Inc., 809 F. Supp.
646 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
45
42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1994)(giving "disposal" the same meaning as
section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act amending RCRA, codified at 42
U.S.C. 6903 (1994). The term "disposal" is defined by RCRA as "the discharge,
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous
waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the
air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters"). Judicial
interpretations of what constitutes "disposal" appear broad, see, e.g., Nurad, Inc.
v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 940 (1992)(holding that "disposal" has a range of meanings, and does not
require "active human conduct").
46
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994).
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of active conduct.47 Such strict interpretations, however, appear to be
the exception, not the rule.48
The third group liable under CERCLA are any parties who
arranged for the disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance
owned or possessed by the arranger, at another party's facility, when
a release or threat of release resulting in response costs took place at
the facility.49 There are no rules for the absolute determination of
"arranger" status; the facts of each case have been held
determinative." Generators of hazardous substances have been held
to fall within this category."
The fourth and final category of PRPs under CERCLA are those
persons who accept a hazardous substance for transport to a disposal
facility chosen by the transporter, and where a subsequent release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance occurs with resulting
response costs.5 2 A party accepting hazardous substances for
transport to a disposal facility which is chosen by anyone other than
the party receiving the hazardous waste, will not be liable under this
provision of CERCLA.5 3

Nurad, Inc. v. William E.Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d at 845.
48
See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir.
1996)(differentiating disposal from release, with ownership during the former a
47

prerequisite to liability under CERCLA); Plaskon Electronic Materials, Inc. v.

Allied Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ohio 1995)(holding that passive
migration of pollutants that were released during a prior owner's tenure is not

sufficient to result in PRP status under section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA).
42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(3) (1994).
50
South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402 (11th
Cir. 1996)(noting that CERCLA provides no definition of an "arranger"); see also
United States v. Gordon Stafford, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. W.Va. 1993).
51
See United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1444 (W.D. Okla.
1990)(CERCLA liability for a generator does not require generator's knowledge
that disposal would occur at a certain site, nor does a belief that the substances
49

would be disposed of elsewhere prevent liability).
52
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994).
53

Id
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b. Strict Liability
Strict liability, in general, is defined as liability that is imposed
upon a party regardless of that party's intent to interfere with a legally
protected interest of another party.5 4 There is no requirement under
strict liability that the party being held liable breached a duty of
care."5 Consequently, strict liability is commonly referred to as
liability without fault.56 Lack of intent, lack of negligence, or lack of
the existence of a duty of care are not defenses to an action based
upon strict liability. 7
Strict liability for violators of CERCLA has been established as
the applicable standard of liability as a result of CERCLA's definition
of "liable."5" The CERCLA definition of liable refers to section 311
of the CWA. 9 Although strict liability is not explicitly specified as
the standard of liability by section 311 of the CWA,6° past judicial
interpretations of section 311 of the CWA have interpreted that
section as specifying strict liability as the standard to be followed in
determining liability.61
Section 107 of CERCLA 62 also has been interpreted as not
requiring proof that a defendant in a cost recovery action caused the
release or disposal of a hazardous substance.63 The only requirements
that must be set forth in a cost recovery action against a PRP under

54

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 75 (5th ed. 1984).
55

Id.

56

Id.

37

Id.

58

42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1994).

59

Id.

33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
see also United States v. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
62
63
Textron, Inc., By and Through Homelite Div. v. Barber-Colman Co., 903
F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. N.C. 1995).
60

61
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section 107 of CERCLA 4 are that: (1) the defendant fits into one of
the categories of PRPs established by CERCLA; (2) a hazardous
substance was released, or there was a threat of such a release, from
a facility; (3) costs were incurred as a result of the release or
threatened release; (4) these costs were necessary to respond to the
release or threatened release; and only when the action is brought by
a private party (5) these costs were consistent with the "national
contingency plan"65 (NCP).66
e.Joint and Several Liability
The term "joint and several liability" is not found within the
statutory language of CERCLA. The concept of joint and several
liability, however, has generally been applied to defendant PRPs in
CERCLA cost recovery actions, but such application is not mandated
by CERCLA.6 7
The theory of joint and several liability provides for
apportionment of damages among liable parties only in those
circumstances where a defendant can demonstrate that the harm is
divisible.6" Any one party found liable jointly and severally is
potentially responsible for the entire amount of the plaintiffs
recoverable response costs.69 The plaintiff in a-case where joint and

64

42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).

Id § 9605(a)(requiring that EPA establish procedures for the cleanup of
hazardous substances that have been released, including steps to identify the
necessary level of cleanup).
66
Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 155 B.R. 890 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
67
See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808, 810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983)(recognizing blanket application of joint and several liability is not
mandated under CERCLA; where a party seeks to limit CERCLA liability, the
burden of proving facts that merit such a limitation is on the party seeking such a
limitation).
68
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965), § 881 (1979).
65

69

7-1
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several liability is applicable bears no burden to prove the damages
are not divisible.7 °
An example of the application of this principle would be a group
of three separate entities who each shipped the same type of
hazardous substances, in similar containers, to a storage facility in
1970. Subsequently, one of these containers released the hazardous
substance into the environment in 1988 and the identity of the
generator of that container cannot be determined. CERCLA liability
provisions render each of the entities PRPs as they arranged for
disposal of a hazardous substance that has been released into the
environment. 71 Because the harm is indivisible (since the origin of
the container cannot be determined) each of the PRP entities may be
jointly and severally liable for those response costs, consistent with
the NCP, incurred as a result of the release. 72 This is despite the fact
that only one of the entities shipped the container from which the
hazardous substance was ultimately released.
One scenario where courts have recognized an exception to the
imposition ofjoint and several liability under CERCLA is a situation
where harm is shown to be divisible.73 Modifying the above example,

70

See Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124

(W.D. N.Y. 1991)(holding that CERCLA liability is joint and several unless liable

parties establish that the harm done is divisible among themselves, thus, this
presumption negates the existence of any affirmative burden on the plaintiff to
show indivisibility of harm).
71
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1994).
72
Unites States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
73
See generally In re Bell Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir.
1993)(although joint and several liability is often imposed under CERCLA,

defendant met it's burden of showing harm was divisible and that imposition of
joint and several liability was not appropriate); United States v. Alcan Aluminum,
Inc., 964 F.2d 252 (3rd Cir. 1992)(defendant capable of proving harm it caused that
resulted in the incursion of CERCLA response costs is divisible is only liable for
costs associated with the harm it was responsible for causing); Laidlaw Waste
Systems, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. Mo. 1996)(holding that
joint and several liability applies in a CERCLA cost recovery actions absent a
showing by the defendant of divisibility of harm, with the court noting such a
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assume each entity shipped its hazardous substance in different types
of containers, and that proof of this fact existed. Two of the three
PRPs could conceivably escape joint and several liability if they
could further show that the release of the hazardous substance was
from a container of a type different from the ones they used.74
However, in the scenario where divisibility could be shown, such
a showing does not automatically absolve a PRP from CERCLA
liability.75 Such a PRP still will be liable for costs incurred as a result
of any response action (i.e., removal of the hazardous substance sent
by the PRPs) in connection with the removal of the hazardous
substances sent by the entities who established divisibility.76
The applicability of joint and several liability may also be
dependent upon the type of action brought against the PRP.
Discussion of the consequences of being a PRP are discussed in more
detail in the next section, but, in general, there are two types of
actions where a PRP may find itself a defendant: (1) a cost recovery
action brought under section 107 of CERCLA;77 or (2) an action for
contribution brought by another PRP under section 113 of
CERCLA. 71 Courts have held that liability is joint and several in cost

showing is often a difficult task).
74
See Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624
(E.D. Mo. 1996).
75
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). It is emphasized that a showing of divisibility
is not analogous to a showing of not falling into one of the categories of liable
parties set forth in CERCLA.
76

77
78

Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
Id.
Id. § 9613(f). To date, every federal Circuit Court of Appeals that has

examined the issue of whether a PRP may bring a cost recovery action under
section 107 of CERCLA against other PRPs has answered in the negative,
relegating PRPs to contribution actions against other PRPs as set forth by section
113 of CERCLA. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Halliburton Nus Corp., 111 F.3d
1116, 1120 (3rd Cir. 1997); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94
F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50
F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995); United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris

Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir. 1994); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,
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recovery actions, but only several in contribution actions. 9
The ramifications ofjoint and several liability are potentially very
costly because a PRP whose actions contributed little to the problems
that resulted in the plaintiffs response costs may ultimately be liable
for the entire cost of the cleanup.8
d. Consequences of Liability
One possible consequence of PRP status is subjecting the PRP to
an EPA administrative order to take remedial action that is necessary
as a result of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
for which PRP status is established.8 The PRP does not have the
option of seeking pre-enforcement judicial review of such a cleanup
order. 2 Failure to comply with a cleanup order subjects the PRP to
penalties of up to $25,000 per day and treble punitive damages. 3
Another possible consequence of PRP status is that a PRP may be
liable in a cost recovery claim under section 107 of CERCLA 4 for:
(1) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government, a State or an Indian Tribe that are not
inconsistent with the NCP developed by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA);85 (2) other necessary costs incurred by any

30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994); (all rejecting the availability of a cost recovery
action as set forth by section 107 of CERCLA as allowing a PRP to bring a cost
recovery action against other PRPs). There are federal District Courts which have
allowed PRPs to bring cost recovery actions against other PRPs under section 107
of CERCLA that have not yet been overruled by appellate decisions. See e.g., City
of North Miami, Florida v. Berger, 828 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Va. 1993).
79
Plaskon Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644,

651-652 (N.D. Ohio 1995); see also Kaufman and Broad-South Bay v. Unisys
Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
80
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supranote 68 at §§ 433A, 881.
81
42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994).
82
Id. § 9613(h).
83
84
85

Id. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3).
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
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other person consistent with the NCP; 6 (3) damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from the release
of a hazardous substance; 7 and (4) the costs of any health
assessments or studies of health effects that are undertaken. 8
To avoid liability a defendant in a cost recovery action brought by
federal, state or Indian governments needs to prove that actions taken
by those seeking recovery of costs were inconsistent with the NCP. 9
However, private parties seeking recovery for their response costs
have the burden of showing that their actions were consistent with the
NCP.90
Another consequence of CERCLA liability is that PRPs are also
subject to CERCLA contribution actions brought by other PRPs.91 A
PRP that has been held liable under a cost recovery action brought
under CERCLA, or that has agreed to take remedial actions at a site
after receiving a cleanup order issued under CERCLA, may pursue
an action to receive contributions from other PRPs.9 The potential consequences of CERCLA liability are clearly
costly. Attention will be focused on whether these same ramifications
exist for federal agencies who fall within the statutory language
defining PRPs.
2. Federal Government Liability and Consequences
Section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA explicitly states that its provisions
are applicable to all branches of the federal government (judicial,

86
87

8s
9

Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).

Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(D).
United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510

U.S. 913 (1992).
90

1993).
91
92

City of Heath, Ohio v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Ohio

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1994).
U
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executive, and legislative),93 and that the federal government is
explicitly required to comply with the procedural and substantive
provisions of CERCLAjust as any non-governmental entity. 94 Under
this provision, the federal government is explicitly subjected to
CERCLA's liability provisions to the same extent that any other party
Language is also included in
is subject to under CERCLA"
CERCLA stating that nothing in section 120 of CERCLA, "shall be
construed to affect the liability of any person or entity under sections
9606 and 9607 of this title."'96
Section 120 of CERCLA97 does not merely require the federal
government to adhere to the same standards as any other entity.
Section 120(h) of CERCLA 98 mandates certain behavior, in certain
circumstances, from federal agencies which is not required from nonfederal government entities. 99 These additional provisions include
such requirements as positive notification to transferees of federal
property that hazardous substances have been stored at the facility
being transferred for more than one year, released from the facility,
or disposed of at the facility; ° and the inclusion of a covenant in any
deed for facilities transferred by the federal government warranting
that, "all remedial action necessary to protect human health and the

93

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3,

1997)(reference is made to U.S.C.A. in order to cite to a source which includes
amendments to section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA added by Pub. L. No. 104-20 1, 110

Stat. 2484 (1996)).
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1994).

94

95

96
97

Id.

Id.
Id

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(h) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3,
1997)(reference is made to U.S.C.A. in order to cite to a source which includes
amendments added to section 120 of CERCLA by Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat.

98

2484 (1996)).
Id. § 9620(h).
too

Id. § 9620(h)(1).
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environment with respect to any such substance remaining on the
property has been taken before the date of such transfer."'' 1
The federal government has been found liable under section 107
of CERCLA 02 based upon judicial findings that the government met
the requirements of being an operator of the facility at the time
disposal of hazardous substances took place at the facility in
question." 3 Specifically, the federal government has been held liable
under section 107 of CERCLA0 a as an operator of a facility as a
result of extensive regulation of that facility, although the facility was
privately owned.105
Clearly, sovereign immunity of the federal government from
CERCLA liability is waived because the federal government is
subject to the same liability under CERCLA as any other entity.1" 6
This includes CERCLA's provisions regarding behavior that results
in PRP liability, the application of the same CERCLA strict liability
standards, the application of CERCLA's joint and several liability
standards, and being subject to CERCLA cost recovery actions. 107
CERCLA also contains an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity
provision which makes state laws concerning removal and
remediation actions applicable, in certain circumstances, to the
federal government.0' This waiver is applicable with respect to state
laws concerning removal and remedial actions, including state laws
governing enforcement, "at facilities owned or operated by a
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States," and
certain property transferred by the federal government where the

101
102
103

1994).
104
105

1994).

Id. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)(I).
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir.

42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
FMC Corp. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir.

107

42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1994).
Id.

108

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).

106
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notice requirements of section 120(h) of CERCLA °9 have been
deferred in accord with the provisions of that section."' Emphasis
will be on the adequacy of the provisions requiring current federal
ownership or operation, in light of the applicability of CERCLA
liability to the federal government, because the provisions regarding
waiver of the federal government sovereign immunity from state
CERCLA-like laws for certain transfers of federal facilities is very
narrow in its applicability. "
C. Defenses to CERCLA Liability
CERCLA provides a limited number of affirmative defenses to
any PRP.1"
These defenses are available equally to federal
government PRPs, as they are to any other PRP." 3 Additional
defenses are provided by CERCLA to the federal government" 4
19
1to

Id. § 9620(h).
Id. § 9620(a)(4).

11
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1994). Emphasis is placed on the ownership and
operation requirements as the waiver provisions of section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA
pertaining to certain transfers of federal facilities is explicit as to when it applies,
and its application is narrow due to the procedural requirements of the transfer that
are necessary for the waiver to apply. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a), (h) (West,
WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997)(note 10 of this paper contains excerpts of
section 120(h) of CERCLA outlining the procedural requirements of a transfer of
a federal facility necessary for the waiver contained in section 120(a)(4) of
CERCLA applicable to such transfers to apply).
112
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b), 0) (1994).
113
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997)(this
assertion follows from this section making all portions of section 107 of CERCLA
applicable to the federal government, and would thus include defenses contained
therein).
114
42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(j)(3), 9607(d) (1994)(the former provides that PRP
status is not conferred upon the federal government when it acquires property in
order to conduct a remedial action under CERCLA, the latter provides that there
is no liability from the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance as a
result of rendering care, assistance or advice consistent with the NCP absent any
negligence).
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There are several statutory defenses available to a PRP. 1 5 The
PRP has the burden of proof to establish these defenses by a
preponderance of the evidence." 6 These defenses are releases
resulting solely from: (1) an act of God;117 (2) an act of war;l1 ' (3) the
actions of a third party;119 or any combination of the actions covered
by the preceding three defenses. 20 Under the last defense, there is an
"innocent landowner defense."'' The innocent landowner defense is

115

42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994).

116

Id.

Id § 9607(b)(1); see also United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053
(C.D. Cal. 1987)(holding that heavy rain resulting in a release of hazardous
substance was not an act of God, but rather a foreseeable occurrence, thereby
nullifying the use of this defense).
1,8
Id § 9607(b)(2)(this defense would be available, for instance, if as a result
of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, a release of a
hazardous substance occurred); see also United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F.
Supp. 962 (C.D. Cal 1993)(government regulation of the production of aviation
fuel during World War II not an act of war within the meaning of CERCLA, and
cannot be used as a defense to the release of hazardous substances following
production of the aviation fuel needed for the war effort).
119
Id. § 9607(b)(3)(providing a defense if the release of the hazardous
substance from the facility was caused by a third party, but the third party cannot
be an agent or employee of the party asserting the defense, nor can the third party's
act have occurred in connection with a contractual relationship with the person
asserting the defense. Further, the party asserting the defense must establish that
he exercised due care regarding the hazardous substance, and that he took those
precautions from acts or omissions reasonably foreseeable to result from the third
party's actions or omissions.); see also City of Detroit v. A. W. Miller, Inc., 842 F.
Supp. 957 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
120
Id. § 9607(b)(4)(allowing for a defense based upon a release of a
hazardous substance resulting solely from a combination of an act of war, and act
of God and/or an act of a third party where the requirements of section 107(b)(3)
are met).
121
See, e.g., In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 174 B.R 148 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1994)(holding that the innocent landowner defense requires the party asserting the
defense to show that he exercised due care with respect to hazardous substances,
took necessary precautions against the foreseeable acts of third parties).
"17

40
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22
contained within CERCLA's definition of contractual relationship,
and requires the party asserting the defense to show that "appropriate
inquiry" 1 was made regarding the prior disposal or placement of
hazardous substances at or on the property prior to the purchase.
A PRP is not liable in any cost recovery action when the release
of the hazardous substance was a "federally permitted release." 124 A
release of this type would include one that is in compliance with the
terms of a permit issued in accord with a federal environmental
25
statute.
Courts generally have held that these defenses provided in the
language of CERCLA are the only defenses available to a PRP in a
suit brought under CERCLA. 26 The use of equitable defenses by
PRPs has been rejected by the majority of courts considering the

subject.

127

There is no mention of the invocation of sovereign immunity by
the federal government as a defense to a CERCLA action where it is
a PRP. The contrary, as previously mentioned, is true. Except as
provided in sections 1040)(3) and 107(d) of CERCLA,'2 s the federal
government is generally held to the same liability standard, including
29
the limitation on available defenses, as any other CERCLA PRP.1

2
124

42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1994).
Id.§ 9601(35)(B).
Id. § 96070).

125

Id. § 9601(10)(defining federally permitted release).

in

See United States v. Rohm and Haas Co., 939 F. Supp. 1142 (D. N.J.
1996)(CERCLA liability can only be defeated through the use of defenses listed in
CERCLA); see also State of Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 742 (D. Ariz.
1992); United States v. Azreal, 765 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Md. 1991).
127
See United States v. Rohm and Haas Co., 939 F. Supp. 1142 (D. N.J.
1996); Union Carbide v. Thiokol Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D. Ga.
1994)(equitable defenses not available in a CERCLA cost recovery suit); United
States v. Pretty Products, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1488 (S.D. Ohio 1991); but see United
States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985)(holding
that equitable defenses are proper under CERCLA in determining liability).
128
42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(j)(3), 9607(d) (1994).
126

129

Id. § 9620(a)(1).
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This will be an important consideration when attention is given to the
adequacy of the extent of the current waiver of federal sovereign
immunity in actions brought under state statutes to remediate past
releases of hazardous substances.
1I. STATE LAWS WITH SIMILAR PURPOSES AS CERCLA
Responsibilities delegated to individual states by CERCLA are
rather limited when compared to the delegation of authority to states
under other federal environmental statutes. 30 Under CERCLA, most
remediation and enforcement authority is retained by the federal
government.' 3
The federal dominance under CERCLA should not be construed
to infer that states have remained dormant in the area of cleanup of
sites where there have been releases or threatened releases of
hazardous substances."3 Commentators have noted that the federal
government is not the only governing body with an interest in
protecting the environment."' Judicial decisions have upheld state
requirements under state law imposing more stringent cleanup
standards upon PRPs than contemplated by CERCLA.'34
35
By the mid 1990s, 48 states had enacted CERCLA-like statutes.'
Many of the state statutes are modeled directly upon CERCLA.'36
These statutes are not necessarily exact clones of CERCLA, and have
been grouped into three categories: (1) state statutes similar in scope

A. STIMSoN ET AL., GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: FROM
PREMANUFACTURE TO DIsPOsAL 269 (1993).
131
Id.
130

JAMEs

132

3 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WAsTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY

AND LITIGATION § 13.02[l] (Susan M. Cooke et al. eds., 1995 & Supp. 1997).
133
See, e.g., United States v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 923 F.2d

410 (5th Cir. 1991)(noting that Pennsylvania had claimed an interest in protecting
its environment and its citizens).
134
135
136

Id. at 414-416.
Cooke, et al., supranote 132.
Id.

42
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and basis to CERCLA; (2) state statutes with a narrower scope than
CERCLA; and (3) state statutes with more breadth than CERCLA in
either their scope, their requirements, or both. 3 7 These statutes are
constantly evolving, and this evolution can affect such matters as
determining liability under these statutes. 3 '
These state statutes, in conjunction with CERCLA, have been
critical in efforts to remediate sites where hazardous substances have
been released or threatened with release.' The beneficial effects of
CERCLA have been recognized as significant in on-going efforts to
address the problems of sites where hazardous substances have been
released. 4 ' Over 1,300 sites had been identified in need of cleanup,
and had been placed by EPA on the National Priorities List' (NPL)
by the end of 1994.142 The seemingly large number of sites placed on
the NPL pales in comparison to the number of sites identified by
states for cleanup under state statutes: in excess of 100,000 by the end
43
of 1994, a figure that demonstrates the value of these state statutes.1
Parties that have been held liable under state CERCLA-like
statutes have attempted to assert that these state statutes are
preempted by CERCLA1 44 but courts have not accepted such
preemption arguments. 145 This is not surprising, as CERCLA
contains a broad disclaimer of any such preemptive intent.'46

137

Id

138

Id.

139

Id.

Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994)(the NPL is a list comprised of the most
dangerous sites eligible for cleanup under CERCLA).
140
141

142

Cooke, et al., supra note 132.

143

Id.

144

SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 2.2(B)(2) (Allan J. Topol and

Rebecca Snow eds., 1992).

145
See Chemclene Corp. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Natural Resources, 497
A.2d 268 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985)(finding that Congress had no intent to preempt
state law).
146
42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1994).
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These state laws modeled after CERCLA, as previously
mentioned, may be broader in their coverage (through explicit
language, judicial interpretations, or both) than CERCLA. 147 The
applicability of these state laws to the federal government, however,
is dependent upon the federal government's waiver of its sovereign
immunity.
IV. FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ITS WAIVER
ALLOWING FOR FEDERAL LIABILITY UNDER STATE
CERCLA-LIKE STATUTES
A. Overview of Federal Sovereign Immunity
The principle of sovereign immunity is a derivative of the ancient
divine right of kings. 148 The divine right of kings held that God
ordains the king, and since God can do no wrong, it follows that the
king could do no wrong. 149 This immunity extended from the king to
his government and its individual employees.15 The king, and only
the king, could waive the prohibition against suits against the
sovereign, and allow for his subordinates to be sued for their
actions."'
Sovereign immunity of the federal government has been derived
from this ancient common law doctrine.' 52 The federal government
is the highest governing body in the United States, and as such, the
United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause' has been deemed

147

Cooke, et al., supranote 132.

148

SUSAN L BUCK, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION

AND LAW 93 (1991).
149

150

i$1
152

Id.
Id.
Id.
Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868)(recognizing

that the government would be unable to function without the protection provided
by sovereign immunity).
153

U.S. CONST. art. VI,

cl. 2.
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to prevent suits by states or individuals against the federal
government, when the federal government's action was within the
powers delegated by the United States Constitution.15
One
ramification of this principle is that where sovereign immunity exists
for the federal government, states can't bring suit seeking an order
directing federal compliance with state laws.'55
The federal government, like the ancient king, can waive its
sovereign immunity and require itself to comply with state law.'56
Waiver of sovereign immunity may have been at the king's discretion
in ancient times, but it is the sole province of the Congress in the
United States.' 57 A waiver, when granted by Congress, has been
required to be clear and unequivocal on the face of a statute. 5
Waivers of the federal government's sovereign immunity will be
strictly construed in favor of the federal government; that is,
sovereign immunity is not assumed to be waived where Congress'
intent is not clear.' 9
One example where the federal government has waived, in certain
circumstances, its sovereign immunity from suit is the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). 60 The FTCA allows suits against the federal
government when it has not followed mandatory procedures, or when
it performs a nondiscretionary duty in a negligent fashion.' 6' The
154
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819)(stating that
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution protects the federal
government against actions brought by individual states when the federal
government actions challenged by the state were consistent with the powers the
Constitution gave to the federal government).
155
Id. at 436.
156
See United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
157
See, e.g., United States v. Shapnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958); California

Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987).

United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992); see also United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
159
See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
160
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§1291, 1346, 1402, 2401158

02, 2411-12,2671-80 (1994).
161

Id.
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FTCA does not waive federal sovereign immunity for discretionary
162
functions of federal agents and employees.
The concept of sovereign immunity is extended to states, with
limitations, by the Eleventh Amendment. 63 Under this amendment,
a State and arms of the state, are essentially protected from suits by
its citizens, or citizens of another state, in federal court.'" Municipal
governments and their employees are not protected by the Eleventh
Amendment, but, in some instances, may be protected by extensions
65
of sovereign immunity granted to them by state law.1
Sovereign immunity has been deemed by its critics as an obsolete
doctrine, but such attacks have not rendered it, by any means,
extinct. 6 It has been recognized as a concept that will continue to be
a consideration in matters involving government compliance with
67
statutory laws.

162

Id.

163
164

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

Id (protecting states from suits by citizens of other states); Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1416
(1996)(Congress generally lacks the authority to abrogate by statute the states'
sovereign immunity from suits by its citizens granted by the Eleventh Amendment;
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)(construing Eleventh Amendment to extend
protection to include suits against a state in federal court by its own citizens).
165
See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 445 U.S. 40
(1982)("home rule" did not extend state's exemption from Sherman Act liability to
municipality); but see Scott v. City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir.
1984)(municipality shielded from Sherman Act liability as zoning act was enacted
pursuant to a state law).
166
RIcHARD H. RODGERS, Jr.,
(1977).
167

L.

HANDBOOK ON ENvIRONMENTAL

LAW, § 1.7
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B. Summary of Waiver Provisions of Federal Sovereign in the
CAA, the CWA, and RCRA
Provisions waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity
are contained in the CAA, 6 s the CWA, 169 and RCRA. 17 0 However,
differences exist in the language expressing each of these waivers."7 I
The waiver contained in the CAA has been interpreted to subject
federal facilities to the same requirements as private facilities."I The
relevant part of the waiver states that, "[e]ach department agency, and
instrumentality of the Federal Government...shall be subject to, and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner, and to the
173
same extent as any non-governmental entity."'
The waiver provisions of the CWA are essentially the same as
those in the CAA.7 The pertinent language of the CWA's waiver
reads,
[e]ach department agency, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government .. .shall be subject to, and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local

168

169
170

42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1994).
33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994).

42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1994).
See Wendi Shohen, Note, United States v. Vertac Chemical Corporation,
46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2609 (1995): A Missed
Opportunityto Clarify Whether the Government Waives Sovereign Immunity when
Acting in its Regulatory Capacity, 15 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 143, 155-157
(1996).
171

172

173

Id.at 157.
42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1994).

See Daniel Home, Note, FederalFacilityComplianceAfter UnitedStates
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 631, 652 (1994).
174
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requirements, administrative authority, and process
and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of
water pollution in the manner, and to the same extent
as any non-governmental entity. 175
The provisions waiving sovereign immunity in RCRA have
undergone a substantial revision through the adoption of the Federal
Facilities Compliance Act (FFCA). 176 The FFCA was a reaction to
the Supreme Court's decision in UnitedStates Departmentof Energy
v. Ohio.177 This decision narrowly construed the then existing
provisions of RCRA to exempt the United States (i.e., the federal
178
government) from civil penalties under RCRA.
The FFCA addressed Congress' disagreement with the Supreme
Court's holding concerning RCRA, but it did not amend the sovereign
immunity provisions of the CWA. 179 The FFCA amended RCRA's
waiver provisions to by adding the following language to RCRA:
The Federal, State, interstate and local substantive and
procedural requirements referred to in this subsection
include, but are not limited to, all administrative
orders and all civil and administrative penalties and
fines, regardless of whether such penalties or fines are

1S

33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994).

176

Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992 (FFCA), Pub. L. No. 102-386,

106 Stat. 1505 (1992)(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)(The FFCA
applies only to RCRA).

United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992)(holding
narrowly construed RCRA's and the CWA's waivers of the federal government's
sovereign immunity, thus barring states from imposing civil fines for past
violations of RCRA or the CWA).
17

178

Id.

179

See generally Davenport, supra note 12; Home, supranote 174; Melinda

R. Kassen, The Inadequacies of CongressionalAttempts to Legislate Federal
Compliancewith EnvironmentalRequirements, 54 MD. L. REV. 1475 (1995).
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punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed for
isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations. The
United States hereby waives any immunity otherwise
applicable to the United States with respect to any
such substantive or procedural requirement
(including, but not limited to, any injunctive relief,
administrative order or civil or administrative penalty
or fine referred to in the preceding sentence, or
reasonable service charge). 8 '
Each of these waivers has been attacked as either too narrow in
181
scope, too narrow in scope as judicially interpreted, or both.
Regardless of one's belief regarding the validity of such arguments,
these are the waivers that currently exist under the CAA, the CWA,
and RCRA. These waivers can be used by means of comparison, to
interpret CERCLA's waiver provisions and to analyze what, if
anything, should be done to CERCLA's waiver provisions.
C. CERCLA's Provisions Waiving the Federal Government's
Sovereign Immunity
CERCLA, like the CAA, the CWA, and RCRA, contains
provisions for the waiver of the federal government's sovereign
immunity.' One provision explicitly makes the federal government
subject to the same CERCLA liability and administrative order
provisions of CERCLA as any private party.8 3 These provisions
must be considered when justifying any proposed changes to the

180
18

179.
182

42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1994).

See Davenport, supranote 12; Home, supra note 174; Kassen, supra note
42 U.S.C.A.

§ 9620(a) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3,

1997)(reference ismade to U.S.C.A. as this contains revisions to section 120(a)(4)
set forth by Pub. L. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2484 (1996).
183
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1994).
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section of CERCLA waiving sovereign immunity of the federal
government to state laws with purposes similar to CERCLA.
The provision of CERCLA waiving the federal government's
sovereign immunity to removal and remedial actions under state laws
reads:
State laws concerning removal and remedial action,
including State laws regarding enforcement, shall
apply to removal and remedial action at facilities
owned or operated by a department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States or facilities that
are subject to deferral under subsection (h)(3)(C) of
this section when such facilities are not included on
the National Priorities List. The preceding sentence
shall not apply to the extent a State law would apply
any standard or requirement to such facilities which is
more stringent than the standards and requirements
applicable to facilities which are not owned or
operated by any such department, agency, or
84
instrumentality.
The fact a federally owned or operated facility is listed on the
NPL has been held not to prohibit the application of state CERCLAlike law to the facility."8 5 However, the Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue. Although the Tenth Circuit has held that these
provisions allow the application of state law to removal and remedial
actions at federally owned or operated facilities regardless of NPL

184

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).

United States v. State of Colo., 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1092 (1993) (also holding that Congress did not intend RCRA or state
versions of RCRA to be enforced instead of laws pertaining to removal and
remedial actions).
185
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status," 6 this view has been rejected by a federal District Court."8 7 A
revision of CERCLA may negate this inconsistency if clear statutory
language addressing this issue is included in any amended version of
CERCLA.
The CERCLA waiver provision quoted above also states that a
federally owned or operated facility may not be held by state law to
a higher standard than a non-governmental owned or operated facility
would be held.'88 Absent such a dichotomy in the provisions of a
state's law based upon the existence of federal ownership or operation
of the facility, the state law need only concern removal and remedial
actions in order to be applicable. A state law has been held to meet
these removal/remedial action requirements, based upon its form and
purpose, which was to raise funds for site cleanups and to prevent
future hazards due to improper disposal of toxic wastes through
remedial action and enforcement.8 9 A court also has held that state
CERCLA-like laws need not contain precise standards delineating
violations with absolute certainty in order to be potentially applicable
to federally owned or operated facilities, so long as the focus of the
law is on removal and remedial actions. 9 '
The potential conflict in application of CERCLA's waiver of
federal sovereign immunity provisions to state laws similar to
CERCLA, is in the interpretation of the requirement of current
ownership or operation by the federal government as a prerequisite
186
187

Id.
Warminster Township Mun. Authority v. United States, 903 F. Supp. 847

(E.D. Pa. 1995)(holding no waiver of federal sovereign immunity from compliance
with state law for site on NPL).
188
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).

Crowley Marine Services, Inc. v. Fednav Ltd., 915 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.
Wash. 1995)(state law with the purpose of raising funds for the cleanup of sites
where improper disposal of toxic substances had occurred is applicable to a
federally owned facility under the waiver provisions of CERCLA).
190
United States v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 778 F.
Supp. 1328 (M.D. Pa. 1991)(lack of precise standards regarding violation of state
law pertaining to removal and remedial actions did not affect waiver of federal
sovereign immunity).
189
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for the waiver to operate (unless the facility was transferred subject
to the deferral provisions of section 120(h)(3)(C) of CERCLA and
not on the NPL). 19 1
The current line of reported cases holds that current ownership or
operation by the federal government is required for the waiver
provisions of CERCLA to subject the federal government to liability
under state CERCLA-like laws.' 92 However, these holdings have
been legislatively overruled for those federal facilities transferred in
accord with the deferral provisions of section 120(h)(3)(C) of
CERCLA'9 3 and not on the NPL. These holdings have also been
rejected in an unreported decision by a federal District Court. 94
The current provisions of section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA' 95 have
been held not to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity
from any civil or punitive penalty provisions contained in state
CERCLA-like laws. 196 This is consistent with the current view that
any such waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity
must be clear and unequivocal in form on the face of the statute. 197

191

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9620(a)(4), 9620(h)(3)(C) (West, WESTLAW through

Mar. 3, 1997).
192

See Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D.

Mich. 1993);_Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United
States, 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
193
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(h)(3)(C) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
194
Tenaya Assoc. v. United States Forest Serv., No. CV-F-92-5375 REC,

1995 WL 433290 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1995)(An unreported decision holding waiver
of federal sovereign immunity applicable in any action where the harm occurred

during federal ownership or operation, thus dispensing with the requirement that
federal ownership or operation is necessary at the time the action is brought.
Though of no precedential value even inthe Eastern District of California, the same
decision could be reached in the future in a reported case.); see also 42 U.S.C.A.
§9620(A)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997)(CERCLA's current
provisions regarding waiver of federal government sovereign immunity from state
CERCLA-like laws).
195
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
196
State of Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992).
197

United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
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Although CERCLA's current provisions governing waiver of
sovereign immunity by the federal government in relation to state
laws involving removal and remedial actions, applies only when the
facility in question is currently owned or operated by the federal
government, or the facility was transferred subject to the provisions
of section 120(h)(3)(C) of CERCLA 98 and is not on the NPL.199
However, the state law need only concern removal or remedial
actions in order to meet the criteria necessary to be the type of law
that is potentially applicable to the federal government although it is
unclear whether listing of the site on the NPL renders the waiver
inapplicable. Furthermore, as noted earlier, this waiver is not
applicable to any provisions of a state law that imposes more
stringent standards upon federally owned or operated facilities than
upon non-federal government owned or operated facilities." 0
V.
THE CURRENT INEQUITIES OF THE CERCLA
PROVISIONS
WAIVING
FEDERAL
SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY FOR FEDERALLY OWNED OR OPERATED
FACILITY NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STATE CERCLALIKE LAWS
Arguments can be made that there are inequities in the current
provisions of section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA20 waiving federal
sovereign immunity.20 2 These inequities, arguably, relieve the federal
government from liability in situations where common sense would
dictate liability should exist.20 3 Conversely, the present form of the
waiver provisions can be argued to subject the federal government to
litigation concerning liability under state laws governing removal and
198
199
200

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(h)(3)(C) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
Id. § 9620(a)(4).
Id.

Id.
See Tenaya Assoc. v. United States Forest Serv., No. CV-F-92-5375 REC,
1995 WL 433290 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1993).
203
Id.
201
202
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remedial actions in situations where application of state law unfairly
affects the operation of the federal government. °4
A review of the legislative history of the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)"', which enacted section
120 of CERCLA, 0 6 indicates that Congress intended to have state
CERCLA-like laws apply to federal facilities. 0 7 Unfortunately, there
is no indication as to the purpose or reason for limiting the waiver of
federal sovereign immunity. 2 s This is evidenced by the fact that
courts interpreting this section have relied upon analysis of the plain
language on the face of the statute, while hypothesizing what purpose
20 9
was sought to be furthered by Congress.
The current interpretation of reported cases is that the federal
government must own or operate the facility being subjected to state
law at the time of the lawsuit's initiation, unless the facility was not
on the NPL and was transferred in accordance with the deferral
provisions of section 120(h)(3)(C) of CERCLA. 2"° An opposite view
(that federal ownership or operation of the facility need only to have
been present at the time of the release of the hazardous substance

204

See Stan Millan, Federal Facilities and Environmental Compliance:

Toward a Solution, 36, LoY. L. REV. 319, 326 (1990) (acceptance of such an

argument can serve as a basis for the application of the doctrine of sovereign

immunity).
205
206
207

SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620 (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
See, e.g., A&P 131 CONG. REC. H9550 (statements of Rep. Synar, Rep.

Florio, and Rep. Wyden alluding to the waiver of federal sovereign immunity
contained in SARA).
208
Id.

See Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D.
Mich. 1993); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of Army of United States,
801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992); and Tenaya Assoc. v. United States Forest
Serv., No. CV-F-92-5375 REC, 1995 WL 433290 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1993).
210
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(h)(3)(C) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
See also Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of Army of United States, 801
F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992); CERCLA 42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West,
WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
209
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from the facility) has been taken by a court in an unreported
decision.2 ' This approach conceivably could be followed by federal

courts in circuits where no binding precedent yet exists. The issue
has yet to be addressed by either the Supreme Court, or by Congress
in any proposed amendments to CERCLA.
Acceptance of the prevailing view, that the waiver of federal
sovereign immunity is limited to instances where federal government
ownership and operation is ongoing, or the facility was transferred in
the manner outlined by section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA,21 2 leads to the
potential for ridiculous results. 1 3 The federal government would be
potentially liable under state laws pertaining to "removal and
remedial action" only at a facility currently owned or operated by the
federal government.1 4 '215

See Tenaya Assoc. v. United States Forest Serv., No. CV-F-92-5375 REC,
1995 WL 433290 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1993).
212
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
213
See Tenaya Assoc. v. United States Forest Serv., No. CV-F-92-5375 REC,
1995 WL 433290 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1993).
214
See Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D.
Mich. 1993); and Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of Army of United
States, 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
215
See Mary Ann Gwinn, Wastes May Have ContaminatedMacNeil Island's
Water, SEATTLE TIMES, May 16, 1987, at C20 (Ironically, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, charged with the duty of holding those sentenced for violations of federal
criminal law, including environmental crimes, operated the United States
Penitentiary (USP), MacNeil Island through 1981. This site was contaminated with
320 drums of hazardous waste. The site was subsequently transferred to the State
of Washington. Since the transfer occurred prior to the initiation of any state law
based action, and was not in accord with the procedures waiving the federal
government's sovereign immunity based on the type of transfer (as set forth in
section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA), the federal government's sovereign immunity from
state CERCLA-like laws for the release or threatened release of hazardous
substances on the former site of USP MacNeil Island would not be waived.); and
Jeffrey A. Roberts, OSHA cites Jeffcofederalprison - Employees worked in offlimits area,DENVER POST, April 7, 1994, at B4 (This article concerns work being
in done in an area at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI), Englewood,
Colorado, identified by EPA as possibly containing buried solvents, liquid-filled
211
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The federal government, however, would be immune from a state
CERCLA-like law action at a similar facility where the contamination
occurred during federal government ownership or operation, but
where the facility was transferred from the federal inventory prior to
the initiation of the state law based action, and was not transferred in
accordance with the deferral provisions of section 120(h)(3) of
CERCLA.21 6 In the latter situation, the federal government would not
escape CERCLA liability due to the provisions of section 120(a)(1)(2) of CERCLA.217 The plain language of the statue may render such
a result correct, but the result has been questioned on policy
grounds.21
In certain situations, application of state laws with purposes
similar to CERCLA to a facility owned or operated by federal
government is more than just unfair due to the fact the federal facility
is covered by CERCLA.2 19 For example, simultaneous litigation
under both CERCLA and state CERCLA-like laws with narrower or
similar liability as CERCLA may interfere with the federal
government's performance of its duties, in such a case, there is
justification for the invocation of federal sovereign immunity from
state laws with the same purpose of CERCLA.22 ' Arguably, state
CERCLA-like laws with broader liability than CERCLA may reflect
a deficiency in CERCLA necessitating amendment of CERCLA
rather than reliance on state CERCLA-like law. This argument is

drums, and radioactive material. The existence of such material at FCI Englewood
would expose the federal government to liability under state CERCLA-like laws,

in addition to CERCLA).
216

See Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D.

Mich. 1993); and Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of Army of United
States, 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(2), 9620(a)(1) (1994).
217
218
Tenaya Assoc. v. United States Forest Serv., No. CV-F-92-5375 REC,
1995 WL 433290 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1994).
219
See generally Millan, supra note 204 (outlining this argument as a
220
justification for sovereign immunity).
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bolstered by the retrospective nature of CERCLA,211 and the
limitations on representation of the federal government's interests in
state legislatures.
CERCLA is designed to deal with past transgressions resulting in
The word
contamination of the environment today.222
"transgressions" is in itself potentially misleading, because the strict
liability under CERCLA makes the results of conduct that may have
formerly been acceptable behavior subject to liability under
CERCLA.P CERCLA, despite this retroactive nature, has been held
to be constitutional.224 Similarly, retroactivity attacks on state laws
based upon CERCLA will also be unsuccessful. 225
The federal government is unfairly prejudiced when the federal
government is liable under state CERCLA-like laws because the
federal government is one entity with no representation in the state
legislatures. Furthermore, the federal government lacks lobbyists
equivalent to those of other PRPs who can lobby state lawmakers to
oppose their adoption of state CERCLA-like laws. Any other entity
who is a PRP has some means by which to be heard in the debate
nit

See MILLER & JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 52 (CERCLA regulates the

present effects of past acts).
222

Id.

223

Id.
United States v. Rohm and Haas Co., 939 F. Supp. 1142 (D. N.J. 1996)

224

(CERCLA's retroactivity does not violate due process, ex post facto, or bill of
attainder provisions of the Constitution of the United States); see also Nevada v.
United States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996); Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery &
Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Pa. 1996); but see United States v. Olin Corp.,
927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997)(Federal
district court held the retroactivity of CERCLA did not meet the test outlined in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), that absent a clear
congressional intent, a statue should not be presumed to be retroactive. This test
has been presumed to be met by other courts. This decision stood alone, and was
reversed).
225
State laws would likely withstand the same scrutiny applied by courts
examining CERCLA. However, if the intent of the legislative body regarding the

retroactive application of the state law is held to be unclear, the state law may be
deemed not to apply retroactively.
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over the adoption and revision of CERCLA-like state laws by
individual states. Persons residing in states have the power of the
vote, and the power to make contributions to help elect lawmakers
who are sympathetic to their point of view. Corporations can rely on
their employees in the election and lobbying of state legislators.
Those PRPs who are not residents of a state do not have the power of
the vote, but nonetheless have the power of the wallet to assist the
election of those likely to represent their interests.
Federal agencies are more vulnerable to the legislative whims of
a state as a result of this lack of a direct voice in the direction of state
laws. Conversely, every entity with a voice in state government has
a voice in federal government, and thus has a say as to the form and
content of federal legislation, including CERCLA.
CERCLA does protect the federal government from the
application of state standards that are stricter for federal facilities than
for non-governmental facilities.226 Despite this, the potential exists
to have a state pass a law that facially applies the same standard to all,
but with the practical affect of imposing stricter standards on federal
2 27
facilities.
The result is the potential, albeit a limited one, for inequitable
treatment of the federal government, an entity that critics may deem
as a faceless bureaucracy, and the expenditure of federal government
resources to comply with state CERCLA-like laws with the same

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978)(Holding that a
state regulation must not: (1) discriminate against federal functions; (2)produce
revenue for the state which exceeds the cost for the benefits provided; and (3)
control, interfere with or destroy the ability for the federal government to perform
essential functions). A statute that imposed stricter penalties on large facilities may
meet this test assuming non-federal facilities are subject to the same requirements,
thus, the statute would be permissible on its face, but further examination may be
necessary to determine any ulterior motives that would render the law void, as
applied.
226

W22
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purpose, and possibly the same results, as CERCLA.22 s Ultimately,
the application of state standards, whether draconian or merely
duplicative, to the federal government may affect the federal
government's ability to best use its limited resources, thereby
affecting its ability to effectively govern. 229
Admittedly, this is an abstract theory, but it is symbolic of the
unequal footing on which the federal government stands compared to
others subject to state CERCLA-like laws. This inequality, and the
possible ramifications upon operation of the federal government,
coincide with the reasons in support of the application by the federal
government of sovereign immunity by the federal government to state
CERCLA-like laws.230
The same argument is inapplicable to those state laws that
"'
regulate present and future behavior by the federal government.23
The reason for the difference is that all affected parties, including the
federal government, are apprized of what standard of future conduct
is required under such state statutes, and can modify their present and
future behavior accordingly.232
Any statutory provision can be criticized as being either too
lenient, or too strong - and CERCLA section 120(a)(4)233 is no
exception. The question remains, based upon the two foregoing

Hypothetically, a state law may have been interpreted to have a more
restrictive definition for the defense of "Act of God" than does the defense under
CERCLA. Despite the fact the case would likely be in federal court due to removal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994), the court would apply state law for the state law
claim. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
229
See Millan, supra note 204 (such an interference, depending on its
magnitude, could justify the invocation of sovereign immunity).
228

230

Id.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. 11995); 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1994 & Supp. 11995); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. 11995).
232
Id.; see also MILLER & JOHNSTON, supra note 20 (describing and
comparing the retroactive nature of CERCLA to other environmental statutes).
233
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
231
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examples of criticisms of the statute as written, what, if anything,
should be done to revise section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA? 234
VI.
GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR THE POSSIBLE
REVISION OF CERCLA PROVISIONS WAIVING FEDERAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO CLAIMS BASED UPON STATE
LAW
There are several general directions that could be followed
regarding the revision of the provisions of CERCLA waiving the
federal government's sovereign immunity to actions based on state
laws concerning removal and remedial action. Each of these have
their own advantages. None of these directions provide a panacea
that will be satisfactory to all, but may provide a more equitable
situation.
A. Completely Waive the Federal Government's Sovereign
Immunity from State CERCLA-like Laws
The broadening of the waiver of federal sovereign immunity from
state CERCLA-like laws to include all instances where the federal
government qualifies as a PRP under state CERCLA-like laws is one
direction that could be followed. Such a revision would easily
coincide with the existing language of CERCLA making CERCLA
itself applicable to the federal government.235
This option would no doubt please those who have decried the
hypocrisy associated with the federal government's use of sovereign
immunity to avoid being subject to the requirements of state
environmental laws.236 This approach would also eliminate the

234

Id.

235

42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1994).

236

See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 12; Laverdiere, supra note 27; Home,

supranote 174; Millan, supranote 204; (all containing criticisms of the application

of federal sovereign immunity to escape liability under state environmental laws);
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curious, and largely unexplained reasoning, of limiting application of
state CERCLA-like laws only in cases where the federal government
owned or operated a facility at the time of the commencement of the
state law based action, or where transfer of the federal facility is
covered by the exception given in section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA."
Such a change would not be without precedent, and could be
characterized as more evolutionary than revolutionary.238 This
extension would be less of a change in policy than that contained in
the FFCA,3 passed in response to the ruling in UnitedStates Dept.
of Energy v. Ohio.24 A revision of this magnitude would represent
a natural extension of CERCLA's existing provisions, and would
indicate a sense of accountability by the federal government.
Arguably, the existing waiver provisions in CERCLA are more
of a departure from what its critics charge is the archaic doctrine of
sovereign immunity. 241 A limited waiver is already exists in section
120(a) of CERCLA.242 Any revision along the proposed lines would
merely be a natural extension of CERCLA's current waiver
provisions.
but see Tricia R. Russo, Case Note, FMC Corp. v. United States Department of
Commerce: An Overexpansion of"Operator"Liability Under CERCLA, 7 VILL.

L.J. 157 (1996)(criticizing the holding in the case as not having fully
considered the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its application).
ENVTL.

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997);
Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Mich. 1993); and
237

Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, 801 F.
Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992); (both cases holding the provisions of CERCLA

section 120(a)(4) necessitate federal ownership or operation of the facility at the
time of commencement of a law suit based on state CERCLA-like law in order for
sovereign immunity to be waived).
239
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994); 42 U.S.C.
§6961(a) (1994); (provisions of the the CAA, the CWA and RCRA waiving
sovereign immunity of the federal government).
239
42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1994)(location of the codification of the pertinent
terms of the FFCA).
240
241
242

United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
See Millan, supranote 204.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
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A clearly worded revision would also have the beneficial effect
of clarifying when the waiver is applicable. 43 This clarification
would reduce the need for judicial attempts to decipher what was the
intent of Congress. Reduction in the amount ofjudicial interpretation
of section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA2" may have several benefits,
including: (1) uniformity in the interpretation of the applicability of
CERCLA's waiver provisions; (2) less litigation concerning what is
covered by the CERCLA's waiver provisions, with the residual effect
of reducing court dockets; and (3) quicker settlements as a result of
less litigation, making the cleanup process more efficient.
B. Keep the Existing Waiver Provisions of CERCLA but Provide
Additional Guidance on Issues Currently Subject to Judicial
Determinations
There is a well worn axiom that sets forth the proposition that
sometimes the best move one can make is to make no move at all.245
Application of this line of thinking to the current provisions of
CERCLA section 120(a)(4)2 46 would result in maintenance of the
status quo.
One advantage of the current arrangement is the existence of a
line of case law that defines the coverage of the waiver of federal
243

Compare Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224

(W.D. Mich. 1993), andRedland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of
the United States, 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (both cases holding the
provisions of CERCLA section 120(a)(4) necessitate federal ownership or
operation of the facility at the time of commencement of a law suit based on state
CERCLA-like law in order for sovereign immunity to be waived), with Tenaya
Assoc. v. United States Forest Serv. No. CV-F-92-5375 REC, 1995 WL 433290
(E.D. Cal. May 19, 1995) (holding federal ownership at the time of contamination
is sufficient to waive sovereign immunity to state law based claims).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
244
The origin of this clichd is not known, but its application is exemplified
245
by the baseball general manager who is trying to trade a player, doesn't, and then
the player goes on to have the best season of his career.
246

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
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sovereign immunity provision to actions based upon state CERCLAlike laws.247 The potential exists for future conflicts in judicial
interpretation, but to date, uniformity in judicial determinations is far
more prevalent than inconsistency.248 Congress could act by
incorporating these judicial decisions into the language of CERCLA,
eliminating the need for future litigation of these matters in courts not
bound by these decisions, thus ensuring uniformity of application of
the statute.249
The rationale (reliance upon the plain language of the statute as
evidence of Congress' intent) for the application of the waiver
provisions to only those facilities currently owned or operated by the
federal government may seem hypocritical. This appearance of
hypocrisy should be left for debate by the academic community,
without major ramifications for those pursuing actions against the
federal government. Congress chose to limit the waiver as it did, and
deference should be given to the plain language of the statute.250
247

See, e.g., Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224

(W.D. Mich. 1993); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the
United States, 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992); United States v. State of Colo.,
990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1092 (1993); Warminster Tp.
Mun. Authority v. United States, 903 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1995); and 42
U.S.C.A. §9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
248
This is not to say differences do not exist, compare Rospatch Jessco Corp.
v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Mich. 1993), and Redland Soccer Club,
Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States, 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa.
1992) (both cases holding that ownership by the federal government must exist at
the time of the commencement of the action for sovereign immunity to be waived
by section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA), with Tenaya Assoc. v. United States Forest
Serv., No. CV-F-92-5375 REC, 1995 WL 433290 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1995)
(federal ownership or operation need only have been in place at the time of
contamination).
249
Congress may overrule any judicial decision by adding express language
contrary to the judicial interpretation, so long as such action would not result in an
unconstitutional statute.
250
See MILLER & JOHNSTON, supranote 20, at 125-126 (outlining rules of
statutory construction employed by courts); see also City of Chicago v.
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994)(opinion by Justice Scalia
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It must be stressed that the federal government is still covered by
the liability provisions of section 107 of CERCLA, 251 allowing for
actions against the federal government under its provisions where the
waiver of sovereign immunity from state CERCLA-like laws is
inoperable.252 Conceivably, despite CERCLA's comprehensive
nature, a state law may be enacted that will provide recourse against
those PRPs who somehow slip through CERCLA 3 Until such time,
any revision to CERCLA section 120(a)(4) 254 may only result in a
new line of cases interpreting the language of the statute, but
providing no additional assistance in the effort to hold particular
persons liable for past releases of hazardous substances.
Some may think that there is no way to satisfy all sides of this
issue. The status quo may not in some circumstances decrease the
amount of money spent on litigation for matters inadequately
addressed by CERCLA, but it may represent a compromise that has
proven itself to be workable.2 5 Revisions of CERCLA limited to
incorporating judicial interpretations of CERCLA's existing
provisions may further benefit both PRPs and plaintiffs in CERCLA
cost recovery actions by encouraging quicker settlements due to
uniformity in CERCLA's interpretation.

relying on "plain meaning" of statutory language in determining coverage of RCRA
§ 3001(I)).
251

252
253

42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
Id. § 9620(a)(1).
Hypothetically, such a law could establish PRP status for someone who

knows of activity that establishes PRP liability for another, but does not report this

activity to the appropriate authorities.
254

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).

255

This assertion is based on the need to litigate preliminary issues such as

applicability of CERCLA 120(a)(4) prior to litigation of the substance of the action.

See, e.g., Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Mich.
1993); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army of the United States,

801 F.Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992); United States v. State of Colo., 990 F.2d 1565
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1092 (1993); Warminster Township Mun. Auth.
v.United States, 903 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1995); and42 U.S.C.A. §9620(a)(4)
(West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
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C. Eliminate CERCLA's Waiver of Sovereign Immunity to
Actions Based on State Law and Preempt State Laws Based on
CERCLA
Repeal of CERCLA section 120(a)(4),256 in conjunction with the
preemption of state CERCLA-like laws, will answer those who
perceive hypocrisy in the current provisions that only waive the
federal government's sovereign immunity from state CERCLA-like
laws in certain circumstances. Such repeal and preemption would
eliminate all actions under state CERCLA-like laws. The limitations
of the provisions of section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA257 waiving the
federal government's sovereign immunity from state CERCLA-like
laws have created a double standard pertaining to when the federal
government waives its sovereign immunity to such laws. 258 These
limitations have not been justified on any rational policy grounds.5 9
The preemption aspect of this option also will eliminate the potential
for litigation against the federal government based on state laws with
purposes similar to CERCLA, alleviating any argued (legitimate or
politically motivated) adverse effects on the federal government's
ability to carry out its duties (which is the rationale behind sovereign
immunity). 260

Those persons who are critical of any amendment of CERCLA,
to re-establish sovereign immunity of the federal government from

256
257

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
Id.

Id.(The federal government's sovereign immunity from state CERCLAlike laws is waived only when: (1) the federal government currently owns or
operates the facility subject to the state CERCLA-like law action; or (2) the facility
was transferred in accord with the provisions set forth in section 120(h)(3)(C) of
CERCLA and the facility is not on the NPL).
259
There is no indication from the legislative history of SARA or Public Law
104-201 why the limitations of section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA exist.
260
Preemption will render CERCLA the only law upon which claims may be
brought for cleanup of sites where past releases of hazardous substances occurred,
unless such releases violate other statutes, i.e., RCRA, the CWA, etc.
258
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state CERCLA-like laws, should be pacified by the preemption of
state CERCLA-like laws.261 This follows because such preemption
will eliminate exposing both federal and non-federal government
entities to liability under state CERCLA-like laws, because such laws
would be preempted.262 This approach would respond to the
argument that it is hypocritical to require non-federal entities to
comply with state CERCLA-like statutes that are inapplicable to the
federal government.
Detailed treatment of preemption in general, and its application
to CERCLA, are beyond the scope of this paper. However, some
basic principles of federal preemption are helpful in understanding
what is thought to be politically necessary to eliminate CERCLA's
present waiver of federal sovereign immunity to state CERCLA-like
laws.
The power of federal preemption is derived form the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.263 Preemption of state law
by the federal government can be accomplished in one of three
ways.264 Congress can: (1) preempt state law by express statutory
language; (2) preempt state law through the use of legislative
language showing the intent to completely occupy the particular area
of law; or (3) implicitly preempt state law when state law conflicts
with provisions of federal law.265
Preemption has been used in other fields of federally regulated
activity. One example is the area of labor-management relations.266

261

See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 12; Laverdiere, supranote 27; Home,

supranote 174; Millan, supranote 204; (all containing criticisms of the application
of federal sovereign immunity to escape liability under state environmental laws).
262
This is the result of the very nature of preemption.
263

U.S. CONST. art. VI,

264

See SUPERFUND LAW AND

cl. 2.

265

Id.

PROCEDURE,

supra note 144, § 2.2(A).

See Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 61 Stat. 136, as amended
by 73 Stat. 519 (1959); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1994)(LMRA amended the National
Labor Relations Act by preempting any conflicting state laws concerning matters
266

covered by federal labor law).
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States have been held to have no jurisdiction in areas where state and
federal labor law overlap.267 The rationale for preemption is the
importance of having a uniform national labor law policy.26
However, both judicial and statutory exceptions to federal preemption
exist, providing for state jurisdiction in certain, limited instances.2 69
The option that is the author's recommendation, if federal
preemption is followed, is the addition to CERCLA of express
statutory language preempting state CERCLA-like laws. Any
peremptory language should clearly include provisions for states to
continue to raise funds through taxation for the purposes of financing
cleanup operations, and provisions that states may continue to bring
cost recovery actions against PRPs under CERCLA. Enforcement of
CERCLA's cleanup requirements would be the primary responsibility
of the federal government under the amendments, with a streamlined
process for states to petition to have the federal government issue
cleanup orders. 70
Alternately, enforcement of a revised CERCLA could be
delegated to the states, whereby each state would be enforcing the
federal CERCLA, a uniform, federal law, in lieu of enforcing their
own state CERCLA-like law.17 ' Either approach could prove to be

Id; see also Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local Union
No. 776, 359 U.S. 291 (1953)(state labor statutes are preempted when conflicting
with federal labor statutes).
268
ROBERT J. GELHAUS AND JAMES C. OLDHAM, LABOR LAW § 114 (1996).
269
See id. §§ 125-142.
267

270

This will allow cleanups to be undertaken by states, and then these funds

can be recouped, where possible, from PRPs through CERCLA cost recovery
actions under section 107. The expedited process for the issuance of cleanup
orders would take the place of any state law provisions similar to those under
CERCLA section 106.
271
See Charles Openchowski, A Shorter, Simpler Approach to Superfund
Reauthorization,27 Envtl. L. Rep. 10357, 10365-10367 (1997); (Suggesting that

any reauthorization of CERCLA include provisions to allow states with CERCLAlike laws that meet or exceed CERCLA to have delegation of the administration of
CERCLA. Though the article envisions such delegation to follow where the
federal law serves as minimum standards for state law, state delegation could also
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workable, as would an intermediate approach where certain
enforcement responsibilities would be delegated to the state, while
others would be retained by the federal government could prove to be
workable. The former approach (exclusive enforcement of CERCLA
by the federal government) is more likely to assure consistent,
uniform application of a CERCLA preempting state CERCLA-like
laws because under this approach, enforcement will primarily be the
responsibility of one entity (the federal government) rather than 50
entities (each state's government).
The result of such an approach will provide a uniform national
policy with respect to the liability of the federal government under
state law for past hazardous waste releases. The policy would be
uniform in its statutory form, and reliance on federal case law will
reduce the number of conflicting judicial interpretations.272
Federal legislation preempting state CERCLA-like law should not
be drafted or adopted until after thorough examination of each state's
current CERCLA-like laws. The federal government should not
preempt any substantive cleanup standards existing under state law
as detailed standards are contained CERCLA.273 This examination

be feasible where preemption of state CERCLA-like laws renders CERCLA the
only applicable standard in each state. Delegation could be based upon criteria

including the adequacy of state funding and staffing levels for their programs.
Such an approach would also be applicable to either the scenario where all federal
sovereign immunity from state CERCLA-like laws are waived, or where the status
quo is retained, with CERCLA serving as the minimum standard for state law prior
to delegation of administration to that state).
272
Differences may arise as a result of different judicial interpretations of
courts in different circuits. The Supreme Court has already provided much
resolution of such conflicts, and since preemption will leave CERCLA essentially
unchanged, there will arguably no more conflicts than would arise without
preemption.
273
See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1994) (final cleanup standards are often
determined by examining standards established under other statutes as CERCLA
contains no such cleanup standards; CERCLA only specifies factors which must
be considered); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(C) (1994). CERCLA requires any
state standards regarding cleanups to be met; however, states are required to help
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should be followed by including into CERCLA any state CERCLAlike law cleanup provisions that will enhance CERCLA's ability to
achieve its goals.274
The original motivation of this approach was an effort to resolve
inequities in the present CERCLA provisions waiving federal
sovereign immunity from state law. The end result, however, may be
far more beneficial in arriving at a uniform national policy to achieve
the original goals of CERCLA.
OF
WAIVER
VII. ELIMINATION OF CERCLA'S
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO ACTIONS BASED ON STATE
LAW AND THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE
CERCLA-Iike LAWS: THE LOGICAL CHOICE
The best way to resolve the inequities of the current waiver of
federal sovereign immunity from state CERCLA-like laws is the
repeal of CERCLA section 120(a)(4) 275 in conjunction with federal
preemption of state CERCLA-like laws, making the federal
government (and all other parties) totally immune from state
CERCLA-like laws. This option not only can be defended on its own
merits, but is further enhanced by some of the shortcomings of either
of the other options previously discussed.

pay for cleanup actions necessitated by their more stringent standards. Since no
CERCLA cleanup standards exist, it is thought states may continue to have their
own cleanup standards exceeding what would result in their absence without a
detrimental effect on federal preemption.

This serves the dual purpose of not weakening a state's existing standards
pertaining to removal and remedial actions, and enhancing CERCLA, which will
be the law applied in all states. One additional consideration would be adding an
expedited process to CERCLA for states to petition EPA to issue orders of this type
under CERCLA section 106, since states would no longer have independent
jurisdiction to issue such orders under preempted state CERCLA-like laws.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
275
274

1997]

EXAMINATION OF CERCLA

A. Expanding the Waiver of Federal Sovereign Immunity - A
Flawed Response
Expanding the existing waiver of sovereign immunity may satisfy
those who simply do not like the doctrine of sovereign immunity.2 76
An expansion, however, implies a deficiency in CERCLA's liability
provisions.277 Why else should the federal government, or for that
matter, any party, need to be held liable under state standards in
addition to those of CERCLA? Those persons who reject the
argument that CERCLA is defective, but persist in arguing that the
current form of CERCLA does not go far enough in cases involving
the federal government, are then faced with explaining why any party
(other than the federal government) also should be exposed to broader
liability under a state law with the same purpose as CERCLA.278
Expansion of the federal government's waiver of sovereign
immunity may be politically correct. Politically correct action should
not be confused with being correct action. Any defects inherent in
CERCLA should be addressed by revising CERCLA to add
beneficial provisions that are currently contained in state CERCLAlike laws that address these defects. This issue is separate and apart
from waiving federal sovereign immunity regardless of the federal
government's current owner or operator status. In short, any
shortcomings in CERCLA are not solved by expanding the federal
government's waiver of sovereign immunity under CERCLA.279

276

See, e.g., Davenport, supranote 12; Laverdiere, supranote 27; Home,

supra note 174; Millan, supra note 204; (all containing criticisms of the application
of federal sovereign immunity to escape liability under state environmental laws).
277

This implication follows as critics of federal sovereign immunity

assuming federal government liability under section 120(a)(1) of CERCLA is

insufficient must also believe CERCLA itself is insufficient.
278
This follows from the reasoning that if CERCLA issufficient, there would
be no need to worry about application of state laws.

This should not be construed as an assertion that CERCLA is deficient in
its present form, rather that expanding the waiver of federal sovereign immunity
would not do anything to rectify any such problems.
279

70
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Expanding federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity
under CERCLA simply to expose the federal government to the same
liability under state CERCLA-like law that non-governmental entities
face is an asinine response. This condemnation is based on the fact
that if a state CERCLA-like law does not contain beneficial
provisions not found in CERCLA, there is no need for redundant
liability to exist under state CERCLA-like law to the same extent it
already exists under CERCLA.8 °
The author also believes that such an approach would fail to
garner the necessary legislative support from environmental
conservatives, who may use the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
defend their actions. Regardless of the ability to get the necessary
support, the solution is not to expand the waiver of sovereign
immunity under the guise of achieving equity.
B. Maintaining the Status Quo - Ignorance is Bliss
Reliance on the status quo can be referred to as the "Ostrich"
approach to legislating.28 ' It may be more politically expedient to do
nothing than it is to address a problem necessitating tough decisions.
The author believes this approach is only attractive in its elimination
of the need to lobby for votes necessary for any type of substantive
change of CERCLA.
The status quo, as described, is not consistent with the
comprehensive nature of CERCLA's own liability provisions. 2 Why
should the federal government receive special dispensation when it
If anything is gained from state laws in addition to CERCLA, the
beneficial provisions should be added to CERCLA. If nothing is gained above
what is provided by CERCLA, then the state laws, arguably, have no purpose for
their application to either federal or non-federal entities.
291
This terminology is based on the ostrich, which places its head into the
ground as a defense mechanism against perceived threats. See Compton's
Interactive Encyclopedia for Windows, "Ostrich" (1994).
282
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994)(provisions establishing PRP status for
liability in cost recovery actions).
280
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comes to liability under state CERCLA-like laws? The lack of an
apparent justification for the present federal ownership or operator
requirement for the waiver of federal sovereign immunity to actions
based on state laws modeled after CERCLA renders the present
provisions to be unjustifiable.2" 3
No purpose is served by merely codifying judicial interpretations,
because the present approach of section 120(a)(4) of CERCLA284 is
without justification. 25" Again, if CERCLA is not comprehensive
enough, change CERCLA instead of relying upon state laws to
address any deficiencies in CERCLA on a hit or miss basis.286
C. Elimination of CERCLA's Waiver of Federal Sovereign
Immunity from Actions Based on State Law and Preemption of
those Laws - The Best Option
The logical, and pragmatic, solution is repeal of section 120(a)(4)
of CERCLA. 217 Admittedly, mere elimination of the waiver of
sovereign immunity may alleviate the expenditure of resources on
duplicative litigation which arguably hinders the effectiveness of the
federal government to carry out its duties. But this approach may be
criticized as marked with the hypocrisy of a, "Do as I say, not as I

283

See Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D.

Mich. 1993) (indicating the lack of legislative history delineating the purpose of
limiting CERCLA section 120(a)(4) applicability to those instances where federal
government ownership or operation is in existence at the time of the
commencement of the legal action).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
284
See Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D.
285
Mich. 1993).
286
Critics who assail that CERCLA is not comprehensive enough to address,
and needs to be supplemented by state laws are then relying on 50 states to
independently correct CERCLA's perceived flaws. The better approach is thought
to be to address CERCLA's flaws in CERCLA, thereby providing the same level
of protection for all 50 states.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
287
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do," regimen. 288 The addition of language resulting in federal
preemption of state CERCLA-like laws would alleviate both
concerns, and therefore may make it politically acceptable to many
of its critics.289
This combination is believed by the author to be palatable to
those who feel strongly about the appropriateness of federal sovereign
immunity (even if such a belief is born more from a conservative
political orientation rather than ardent belief in sovereign irmnunity).
Similarly, this approach can be supported by those legislators who are
more liberal in their philosophy, and do not want the federal
government to receive special treatment under state CERCLA-like
laws as a result of federal sovereign immunity.
Sole reliance on CERCLA to hold the federal government liable
for response costs for removal and remedial actions for the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances is an approach that is both
logical in theory and pragmatic. CERCLA's liability provisions,
previously outlined, have been demonstrated to be comprehensive.29 °
CERCLA has provided the regulatory tools to close the loopholes that
resulted from the CAA, the CWA and RCRA not applying to actions

The author does not necessarily agree or disagree with the validity of an
argument justifying sovereign immunity invocation in response to any perceived
argument that the current arrangement hinders the effectiveness of the federal
government in carrying out its duties, but recognizes such an argument would serve
as the basis for those who believe sovereign immunity is appropriate.
289
The author asserts support will have to come from those on both sides of
this issue (i.e., those who don't feel the federal government should be mired in
liability created by state laws, and those who feel the federal government should
receive no special dispensation from state laws) in order for a compromise to be
288

adopted by Congress.

See, e.g., United States v. Witco Corp., 865 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(CERCLA must be construed broadly in holding parties liable); United States v.
Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962 (C.D. Ca. 1993)(liability provisions of CERCLA
are construed broadly to enable remedial goals to be met); and Lincoln Properties,
Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528 (E.D. Cal. 1992)(aff'rmative defenses provided
for PRPs construed narrowly to facilitate CERCLA's broad goals).
290
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which took place before their adoption but result in releases and
contamination at the present time.29 '
Arguments may be made that CERCLA is far from the most
perfectly worded statute ever to emerge from Congress, and as such,
is not the best place to seek a solution.29 There will be no attempt to
rebut such arguments. Judicial determinations have, however,
clarified many of the questions that CERCLA's textual format left
ambiguous.293
Critics who contend that CERCLA is not comprehensive enough
should direct their efforts to amending CERCLA's provisions to
eliminate perceived deficiencies. This approach is more beneficial
than attempting to rely on state laws to address any weaknesses in
CERCLA, because it assures the same level of protection,
nationwide, through application of uniform liability provisions to
PRPs nationwide.
This approach is also defensible based on the retroactive nature
of CERCLA, which has been upheld as constitutionally valid. 294 This
retroactivity results in litigation over a PRP's past actions, actions
which were not necessarily deemed improper before they took place.
Having one statute, and one body of judicial interpretations of that
statute, arguably puts PRPs in a more certain position. 295 This may
291

See MILLER & JOHNSTON, supranote 20, at 52.

Id. at 53-54 (discussing some of the criticisms that have been made
concerning CERCLA's language); an example of the judiciary's criticism is
292

contained in United States v. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. 573, at 578 (D. Md.
1986).
293
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (latest ed.) (this is one source that
provides references to the plethora ofjudicial interpretations of CERCLA's many
provisions).
294

See, e.g., United States v. Rohin and Haas Co., 939 F. Supp. 1142 (D. N.J.

1996)(CERCLA's retroactivity does not violate due process, ex post facto, or bill
of attainder provisions of the Constitution of the United States); Nevada v. United
States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996); Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire
Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Pa. 1996).

The author contends this result follows from a PRP not having to
simultaneously rely on a federal court's interpretation of CERCLA, and a state
295
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reduce litigation that requires the courts in various jurisdictions to
interpret a wide variety of issues in a number of different state
statutes.296 This approach also make the potential liability of PRPs
more predictable, thus making settlements more predictable and
litigation less attractive. This will result in a more efficient
recoupment of funds expended by individuals, states, and federal
governments in undertaking CERCLA response actions in efforts to
cleanup contaminated sites.297
Federal preemption of state CERCLA-like laws addresses
criticism that the current waiver of the federal government's
sovereign immunity from such laws set forth in section 120(a)(4) of
CERCLA298 is not as broad as similar waiver provisions contained in
the CAA,299 the CWA,3 ° and RCRA.301 The basis for such criticism
is that in order for the waiver of the federal government's sovereign
immunity from state CERCLA-like laws to apply, section 120(a)(4)
of CERCLA 02 requires that the facility in question: (1) is currently
owned or operated by the federal government; or (2) was transferred
by the federal government in the manner set forth in section
120(h)(3)(C) of CERCLA30 3 and is not on the NPL. However, the
waiver of sovereign immunity provisions of the CAA, the CWA, and
RCRA do not require the satisfaction of such stringent conditions in
order for waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity to
court's interpretation of a state CERCLA-Iike law which may be in conflict with
one another.
296
The author's premise for this assertion is that once a judicial interpretation
of a CERCLA provision has been established, there would be no need to interpret
a similar provision of state law as the latter would be preempted by the former,
rendering such an interpretation moot.
297
This premise is based on a predicted reduction in litigation costs to all
parties, resulting in a decrease in the volume and scope of interpretive litigation.
298
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
299
42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1994).
3Do
33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994).
301
42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1994).
302
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
303
Id. § 9620(h)(3)(C).
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state versions of those laws.3 4 Preemption of state CERCLA-like
laws eliminates any concerns regarding the fore-mentioned
differences, because federal preemption eliminates the applicability
of such state laws.
The author does not recommend preemption of state laws derived
from federal environmental statutes other than CERCLA. The main
reason is that these other laws regulate present and future behavior,
and as such, every party subject to these laws has ample opportunity
to follow their provisions before acting in the future, thereby avoiding
liability." 5 Additionally, these other federal laws sometimes require
states to adopt programs at least as stringent as federal standards, and
allow for more stringent standards to be adopted. 0 6
The end result would be the elimination of the existing double
standard applied to the federal government by the limited waiver of
its sovereign immunity set forth in CERCLA section 120(a)(4). 07 In
addition, such an approach would possibly alleviate the need for the
federal government to litigate matters of liability under state
304

See 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994); and 42 U.S.C.

§ 6961(a) (1994); (each containing provisions addressing the applicability waiver
of federal sovereign immunity from state laws).
305
As discussed, CERCLA was meant to close the loopholes resulting from
the CAA, the CWA and RCRA, which regulate future behavior and do not deal
with the release of hazardous substances prior to their enactment. See MILLER &
JOHNSTON, supranote 20, at 52; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp.
11995); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 11995); and42 U.S.C. §§ 69016992k (1994 & Supp. 11995).
306
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b) (1994)(establishing minimum
requirements for state permit programs); CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)
(1994)(allowing states that develop permit programs "substantially equivalent" to
the federal permit program to issue National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System permits, with "substantially being taken to mean more stringent permit

requirements could be adopted by states); and RCRA 42 U.S.C. § 6926
(1994)(similar to the preceding CWA permits, permits for treatment, storage and

disposal facilities may be state issued if the state has adopted a program
"substantially equivalent" to RCRA, thus allowing for, in theory, stricter
requirements).
42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).
307
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CERCLA-like laws, thereby reducing its ability to efficiently perform
its duties a result some persons may argue would result from a
complete waiver. °8 The ancillary result, which may be even more
beneficial, is simplification of the regulatory scheme dealing with
cleanup of where hazardous substances have been released or are
threatened to be released.
The author recognizes that this option may be neither perfect, nor
politically correct, but it is logical, workable, and an improvement
over the present regime.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The federal government is this nation's largest owner and operator
of facilities." 9 Consequently, the issue of the federal government's
liability under state CERCLA-like laws, that apply also to private
persons, is an important issue that is more than an issue of
appearance. Similarly, federal sovereign immunity is a traditional
tool recognized as applicable in numerous situations to assure
operation of the federal government without crippling litigious
interruption? 10
The federal government is currently held to the same PRP
standards as any other entity under CERCLA 111 CERCLA is broad
in its definitions of who are deemed to be PRPs, liability is strict,
liability is often joint and several, and defenses to liability are few
and narrowly construed. 12
Hypocrisy arises when the federal government's invocation of
sovereign immunity excuses it from being held liable under state
CERCLA-like laws. The current waiver of federal sovereign

Recall, hindrance with the ability to carry out its duties is one reason for
the application of federal sovereign immunity.
309
STRATEGY, supra note 11.
310
Millan, supra note 204.
311
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (1994).
312
These are described in Section II of this paper, and by the citations therein.
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immunity provided by CERCLA needs to be changed, and any such
change must eliminate attempts to use federal sovereign immunity,
regardless of its perceived validity, to allow the federal government
to receive special treatment, possibly hindering cleanup efforts.
Similarly, such an approach must not substantially adversely affect
the use of federal resources.
The approach of eliminating the waiver of CERCLA section
120(a)(4)" 3 in conjunction with the preemption of state laws with
purposes similar to CERCLA, renders moot arguments about the
equity of merely eliminating the waiver of federal sovereign
immunity. This approach also eliminates CERCLA's present special
treatment of federal facilities based solely on that federal status, while
eliminating the need to expend resources on the litigation of liability
issues under both state and federal laws.
This approach may be deemed Machiavellian by its critics as
legislative chicanery that will ultimately weaken efforts to remediate
past contamination. This criticism cannot withstand scrutiny when
consideration is given to the broad coverage of CERCLA, and the
equitable side-effect that federal preemption of state CERCLA-like
laws will produce: all parties will be held to the same broad, uniform
federal standards of accountability, interpreted by the same federal
judicial system.
This approach may ultimately do far more than its original
motivation (to abrogate the federal government's liability under state
law CERCLA-like laws). Will this approach solve all the problems
removal and remediation actions associated with releases and
threatened releases of hazardous substances? No. Will it allow more
resources to be directed towards the enforcement of CERCLA rather
than to its interpretation, and interpretation of similar state laws?
Yes. The result not only ends the problem of the hypocrisy that exists
under CERCLA section 120(a)(4), 14 but allows redirection of
resources from litigation involving interpretation of CERCLA, to

313

42 U.S.C.A. § 9620(a)(4) (West, WESTLAW through Mar. 3, 1997).

314

Id.
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efforts which will achieve reimbursement for effective hazardous
substance cleanups.

